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ESSAY FOR THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC CHOICE 
 
 
1.  Scope of the Field 
  Public Finance is the branch of economics that studies the taxing and spending 
activities of government.  The term is something of a misnomer, because the fundamental 
issues are not financial (that is, relating to money).  Rather, the key problems relate to the 
use of real resources.  For this reason, some practitioners prefer the label public sector 
economics or simply public economics.  Public finance encompasses both positive and 
normative analysis.  Positive analysis deals with issues of cause and effect, for example, 
“If the government cuts the tax rate on gasoline, what will be the effect on gasoline 
consumption?”  Normative analysis deals with ethical issues, for example, “Is it fairer to 
tax income or consumption?” 
  Modern public finance focuses on the microeconomic functions of government, 
how the government does and should affect the allocation of resources and the 
distribution of income.  For the most part, the macroeconomic functions of government--
the use of taxing, spending, and monetary policies to affect the overall level of 
unemployment and the price level--are covered in other fields. 
 
2.  Methodological Basis 
  Mainstream economic theory provides the framework for public finance.  Indeed, 
it would not be unreasonable to view public finance as just an area of applied 
microeconomics.  As is the case in other fields of economics, the normative framework of   2
public finance is provided by welfare economics, the branch of economic theory 
concerned with the social desirability of alternative economic states.
1  Much of welfare 
economics focuses on the conditions under which the allocation of resources in an 
economy is Pareto-efficient, defined as an allocation such that the only way to make one 
person better off is to make another person worse off.  Pareto efficiency seems a 
reasonable normative criterion--if the allocation of resources is not Pareto efficient, it is 
"wasteful" in the sense that it is possible to make someone better off without hurting 
anybody else.  A stunning result of welfare economics is that if two assumptions are 
satisfied,  then an economy will achieve a Pareto-efficient allocation of resources without 
any government intervention.  The assumptions are:  1)  All producers and consumers act 
as perfect competitors; that is, no one has any market power.  2)  A market exists for each 
and every commodity.  In a way, this result formalizes an old insight:  When it comes to 
providing goods and services, free enterprise systems are amazingly productive. 
  Suppose for the moment that these two assumptions are satisfied.  Does the 
government have any role to play in the economy?  Only a very small government that 
protects property rights and provides law and order would seem appropriate.  However,  
even if an allocation of resources is Pareto-efficient, it may not be socially desirable.  A 
society may be willing to trade some efficiency in return for a fairer distribution of 
resources among its members (although "fairer" may be hard to define).  Hence, even if 
the economy is Pareto efficient, government intervention may be necessary to achieve a 
fair distribution of real income. 
  Furthermore.  real world economies may not satisfy the two assumptions required 
for Pareto efficiency.  The first assumption is violated when firms have market power and 
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raise their prices above competitive levels.  Monopoly is an extreme example.  The issues 
associated with market power are generally dealt with in the field of Industrial 
Organization, not Public Finance.  The second assumption is violated when markets for 
certain commodities do not emerge.  After all, if a market for a commodity does not exist, 
then we can hardly expect the market to allocate it efficiently.  For example, there is no 
market for clean air.  In effect, individuals can use up clean air (that is, pollute) at a zero 
price.  That particular resource is not used efficiently. 
  Nonexistence of markets occurs in a variety of situations; each one opens 
potential opportunities for the government to intervene and improve welfare.  In effect, 
then, the list of market failures provides the public finance agenda. 
 
3.  Public Expenditure 
  The theory of welfare economics focuses our attention on market failure and 
distributional considerations as reasons for considering governmental intervention.  This 
section illustrates these issues. 
  3.1  Public Goods 
 A  public good has two characteristics.  First, once it is provided, the additional 
cost of another person consuming the good is zero--consumption is nonrival.  Second, 
preventing anyone from consuming the good is either very expensive or impossible--
consumption is nonexcludable.  A classic example of a public good is national defense.  
One person’s consumption of the services provided by the army does nothing to diminish 
another person’s consumption of the same services.  Further, excluding any particular   4
person from the benefits of national defense is all but impossible.  In contrast, a private 
good (such as food) is both rival and excludable.   
  To see why the market may not provide public goods in efficient amounts, note 
that, for a private good, the market in effect forces each person to reveal what his true 
preferences are.  If the value of the commodity to a person is greater than or equal to the 
market price, he buys it; otherwise not.  There is no incentive to hide one’s true 
preferences.  In contrast, people have incentives to hide their true preferences for public 
goods.  Each person knows that once national defense is provided, he can enjoy its 
services, whether he pays for them or not.  Therefore, he may claim that defense means 
nothing to him, hoping that he can get a “free ride” after other people pay for it.  
Everyone has the same incentive, so that defense may not be funded, even though it is in 
fact beneficial.  In short, the market cannot be relied upon to provide a public good in 
efficient amounts; some kind of collective decision making process may be better 
(Samuelson (1954)). 
    While important, this finding does not provide a firm set of guidelines for 
deciding when the government rather than the private sector should provide some 
commodity.  The result depends in part on whether the public and private sectors pay 
different amounts for labor and materials,  the extent to which the government can 
address the diversity of tastes for the commodity among the citizenry, and whether or not 
government provision will have a more favorable (somehow defined) impact on the 
distribution of real income.  Whether public or private provision is better must be decided 
on a case by case basis.  The fact that this can be difficult is reflected in the ongoing   5
political debates in many countries about the merits or privatization--taking services that 
are supplied by the government and turning them over to the private sector. 
  3.2  Externalities 
  When the activity of one entity (a person or firm) directly affects the welfare of 
another in a way that is outside the market mechanism, that effect is called an externality.  
The classic example is a polluter, who imposes losses on other individuals by degrading 
the environment.  In general, efficiency requires that individuals pay a price for any 
commodity that reflects its value in alternative uses.  But there is no market for (say) 
clean air.  Individuals treat it as if its price is zero, and hence use it in inefficiently large 
amounts. 
  There are a number of ways in which government intervention can potentially 
enhance efficiency in the presence of an externality.  1)  It can levy a tax on the 
externality producing activity.  Basically, the tax makes up for the fact that the price 
being faced by the polluter is too low.  2)  It can create a market for the right to pollute.  
Recall that the fundamental problem is that there is no market for the resource being 
polluted.  In some cases, the government can create such a market.  The government 
announces it will sell permits to spew a given quantity of some pollutant into the 
environment.  Firms bid for the rights to own these permissions to pollute, and the 
permissions go to the firms with the highest bids.  Again, firms are forced to confront a 
cost for using up the resource.  3)  It can simply order each polluter to reduce pollution by 
a certain amount.  A major problem with such a command-and-control solution is that the 
reduction in pollution may be greater or less than the efficient amount.  That is, the   6
reduction that the government orders may not be the same reduction that would occur if 
the firm were facing the true price of the resource. 
  In general, most countries rely on command-and-control mechanisms for dealing 
with environmental problems.  However, in recent years market-oriented approaches 
have made some inroads.  In the United States, for example, there is now an active 
market in allowances to emit sulfur dioxide into the air.  An important area for future 
research is to see if it is possible to expand the scope of such policies, and to determine 
whether the efficiency gains that theory predicts actually occur (Stavins (forthcoming)). 
  3.3  Social Insurance 
  One way to obtain some protection against the uncertainties of life is to purchase 
insurance.  In private insurance markets, people pay premiums to an insurance company, 
and receive benefits in the event of certain unlucky occurrences.  In addition, a number of 
government programs also replace income losses that are consequences of events at least 
partly outside personal control.  These programs, collectively referred to as social 
insurance, are among the largest components in the budgets of western governments. 
  Is there a rationale within conventional welfare economics for such substantial 
government involvement in insurance markets?  There are reasons to believe that private 
insurance markets will fail to operate efficiently.  To see why, note that we can expect an 
individual who knows he is especially likely to collect benefits to have an especially high 
demand for insurance, a phenomenon known as adverse selection.  Due to adverse 
selection, in order to break even, the insurance company must charge a higher premium 
for individual coverage than it would if a random group of people were buying insurance.  
However, these higher premiums exacerbate the adverse selection problem.  Only   7
individuals who know they are at great risk will pay the high prices.  This, in turn, 
requires a further increase in premiums, and the pattern continues.  The market fails to 
provide an efficient amount of insurance.
2  In essence, mandatory social insurance solves 
this problem by forcing everybody into one big group--the country.  
  Government retirement programs, which, in effect, provide insurance against the 
possibility that people will outlive the resources they have accumulated for retirement, 
are particularly important forms of social insurance.  Typically, such programs have been 
funded on a pay-as-you-go basis, meaning that the benefits paid to current retirees come 
from payments made by those who are presently working.  The problem is that in most 
countries, the ratio of retirees to workers will be increasing in coming years.  Hence, 
other things being the same, it will be necessary either to increase the tax rate on current 
workers or reduce the benefits received by retirees.  The best way to cope with this 
problem is a major academic and political controversy (Feldstein and Liebman (2001)).  
Considerable attention has been given to privatizing the systems.  Under privatization, 
workers’ contributions are earmarked for their own accounts.  Workers then invest the 
funds in various financial assets, and finance their retirements out of the accumulations in 
the accounts.  Major issues in privatization schemes include how to pay benefits to the 
current generation of retirees, and how to provide a socially acceptable living standard to 
individuals who are unable to accumulate enough wealth in their accounts during their 
working lives . 
  Other forms of social insurance are unemployment insurance and health 
insurance.  Unemployment insurance provides benefits to workers who lose their jobs.  
The major problem is how to devise systems that provide protection but do not at the 
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same time make unemployment too attractive (Meyer(1995)).  One of the main issues in 
health insurance is the extent to which the government should directly provide insurance 
as opposed to providing people with incentives to purchase insurance on the private 
market.  Various nations have come up with quite different solutions.  In Canada, for 
example, health care services are produced by the private sector, with the reimbursements 
negotiated by the government.  In the United Kingdom, health services are produced by 
the public sector through the National Health Service.  In the United States, there is 
publicly provided insurance only for certain groups, basically the elderly (through 
Medicare) and for the poor (through Medicaid).  A particularly contentious and important 
issue is the effect that the various systems have on people’s health status (Fuchs (1998)).   
  3.4  Income Redistribution 
  As noted above, even in the absence of market failures, government intervention 
in the economy may be necessary to achieve a “fair” distribution of real income.  A key 
question in this context is whether the government needs to  intervene directly in markets 
in order to enhance fairness.  For example, should it impose ceilings on the prices of 
commodities consumed by the poor?  The answer is no.  Roughly speaking, it is a better 
policy for the government to redistribute income suitably and then let markets work.  Put 
another way, the issues of efficiency and distributional fairness can be separated.  If 
society determines that the current distribution of resources is unfair, it need not interfere 
with market prices and impair efficiency.  Of course, the government needs some way to 
reallocate resources, and problems arise if the only available mechanisms for doing so 
(such as taxes) themselves induce inefficiencies.  These issues are discussed below.   9
  This whole area is complicated by the fact that there is no consensus on what a 
fair income distribution looks like.  Some believe that the government should engineer 
complete equality.  Others believe that society should move toward equality, but take into 
account the losses in efficiency that are engendered  by taxing high-income people and 
subsidizing low-income people.  Still others believe that attention to the distribution of 
income at a given point in time is misguided; what matters is whether there is social 
mobility over time.  The idea here is that even if people at the bottom of the income 
distribution are quite poor, it may not be a major social problem if the identities of these 
people change over time (Atkinson (1983)). 
  In many countries, income distribution programs rely primarily on in-kind 
transfers --payments from the government to individuals in the form of commodities or 
services rather than cash.  In-kind transfers include medical care, food, housing, and 
energy consumption.  A natural question is why governments so not simply give the poor 
cash and let them spend the money as they want?  One possibility is that policy makers 
care about the distribution of certain commodities rather than income per se.  For 
example, they may want every family to consume housing of a given quality.  In addition, 
in-kind transfers may help curb welfare fraud.  In-kind transfers may discourage 
ineligible persons from applying because some well-off people may be willing to lie to 
receive cash, but be less willing to lie to obtain some commodity they do not really want.  
(Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982)).  Finally, in-kind transfers are attractive politically 
because they help not only the beneficiary but also the producers of the favored 
commodity.  Thus, for example, agricultural interests can be expected to support 
programs for subsidizing food consumption by the poor.   10
  One of the most contentious issues in this area is how income maintenance 
policies affect the behavior of the poor.  Most attention has been focused on work effort--
do beneficiaries reduce their work effort and if so, by how much.  In the belief that 
welfare reduces work effort, several countries have introduced work requirements--in 
order to be eligible for welfare, recipients have to agree to accept work or job-training 
programs. The efficacy of such programs is not yet well understood.  Another open 
question is whether income maintenance programs lead to the creation of a “welfare 
culture”--children brought up in households receiving welfare come to view it as a way of 
life and hence are unlikely to acquire the skills necessary to earn a living.  It is indeed the 
case that a mother’s participation in welfare increases the probability that her daughter 
eventually also ends up on welfare.  However, it is not clear whether the exposure to 
welfare “causes” the daughter to go on welfare, or if other correlated aspects of the 
family environment are responsible (Blank (1997)). 
3.5  A Caveat 
  We have discussed a number of situations in which the government can improve 
welfare by  enhancing efficiency and fairness.  However, the fact that the market-
generated allocation of resources is imperfect does not mean the government is 
necessarily capable of doing better.  For example, in certain cases the costs of setting up a 
government agency to deal with some market failure could be greater than the cost of the 
market failure itself.  Moreover, governments, like people, have only imperfect 
information, and hence can make mistakes.   Finally, it is not clear that government 
decision-makers will have maximizing social welfare as their goal; we return to this 
theme at the end of this essay.  Hence, it is best to think of welfare economics as helping   11
us identify situations in which government intervention may enhance efficiency and 
fairness; whether it actually will needs to be evaluated on a case by case basis. 
 
4.  The Theory of Taxation 
  Taxes are the most important source of revenue for modern economies.  The 
theory of taxation explores how taxes should be levied to enhance economic efficiency 
and to promote a “fair” distribution of income.  Just as in the case of expenditures 
discussed in Section 3, welfare economics provides the underlying analytical framework. 
Various aspects of the theory are discussed in this section. 
  4.1 Tax Incidence 
  Policy debates about taxation are usually dominated by the question of whether it 
burden is distributed fairly.  To discuss this normative issue requires some understanding 
of the positive question of how taxes affect the distribution of income.  A simple way to 
determine how taxes change the income distribution would be to conduct a survey in 
which each person is asked how many dollars he or she pays to the tax collector each 
year.   
  Although such an approach is convenient, it is quite likely to produce misleading 
answers.  To see why, suppose that the government levies a tax of one dollar on the 
sellers of a certain commodity.  Suppose that prior to the tax, the price of the commodity 
is $20,  and that after the tax is levied, the price increases to $21.  Clearly, the sellers 
receive as much per unit sold as he did before.  The tax has not made them worse off.  
Consumers pay the entire tax in the form of higher prices.  Suppose that instead, the price 
increases to $20.25.  In this case,  sellers are worse off by 75 cents per unit sold;   12
consumers are worse off by 25 cents per unit sold.  The burden of the tax is shared 
between the two groups.  Yet another possibility is that after the tax is imposed, the price 
stays at $20.  If so, the consumer is no worse off, while the seller bears the full burden of 
the tax. 
 The  statutory incidence of a tax indicates who is legally responsible for the tax.  
All three cases above have exactly the same statutory incidence.  But the situations differ 
drastically with respect to who really bears the burden.  The economic incidence of a tax 
is the change in the distribution of private real income induced by the tax.  
  The example above suggests that the economic incidence problem is 
fundamentally one of determining how taxes change prices.  In the conventional supply 
and demand model of price determination, the economic incidence of a tax depends on 
how responsive supply and demand are to prices.
3    In general, the more responsive 
supply is to price relative to demand, the greater the share of the tax that will be shifted to 
consumers.  Intuitively, the more responsive demand is to price, the easier it is for 
consumers to turn to other products when the price goes up, and therefore more of the tax 
must be borne by suppliers.  Conversely, if consumers purchase the same amount 
regardless of price, the whole burden can be shifted to them.  In cases where the 
responses of supply and demand to price are well understood, then fairly reliable 
estimates of the economic incidence of a tax can be obtained.  In some areas, the 
behavioral responses are not well understood, and incidence analysis is on less firm 
ground.  For example, there is still great controversy over the burden of taxes on 
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corporations--to what extent are they borne by owners of capital, and to what extent by 
laborers?  This is an important topic for research. 
  4.2  Excess Burden 
  Taxes impose a cost on the taxpayer.  It is tempting to view the cost as simply the 
amount of money that he or she pays to the government.  However, this is only part of the 
story.  A tax distorts economic behavior--in general, consumers buy fewer taxed goods 
and more untaxed goods than otherwise would have been the case.  Their decisions are 
not based entirely on the merits of the commodities themselves.  In the same way, 
business owners make investments based in part on tax considerations, as opposed to 
economic fundamentals.   Because a tax distorts economic activity, it creates a loss in 
welfare that actually exceed the revenues collected.  This is referred to the excess burden 
of the tax. 
  In general, the more responsive behavior is to the tax, the greater the excess 
burden, other things being the same.  Intuitively, because excess burdens arise because of 
distortions in behavior, the more that behavior is capable of being distorted, the greater 
the excess burden.  Another important result is that the excess burden of a tax increases 
with the square of the tax rate--doubling a tax quadruples its excess burden, other things 
being the same.  This means that, in general, it makes sense to spread taxes over as large 
a group of commodities as possible--a small tax on a number of commodities has a 
smaller excess burden than a very large tax on one commodity.
4 
This discussion suggests that,  just like the incidence problem discussed above, 
the excess burden of a tax depends on the behavioral response to the tax.  Estimating such 
behavioral responses and computing excess burdens is an important role for public   14
finance economists.  Some estimates suggest that the excess burdens for real-world tax 
systems are quite high.  One recent survey suggested that in the United States, the 
average excess burden per dollar of tax revenue is 18 cents.  While any particular figure 
must be taken with a grain of salt, virtually all estimates suggest that the tax system is 
highly inefficient in the sense of generating large excess burdens (Jorgenson and Yun 
(2001)). 
  The fact that a tax generate an excess burden does not mean that the tax is bad.  
One hopes, after all, that it will be used to obtain something beneficial for society either 
in terms of enhanced efficiency or fairness.  But to determine whether or not the 
supposed benefits are large enough to justify the costs, sensible policy requires that 
excess burden be included in the calculation as a cost to society. 
  4.3  Optimal Taxation 
  Public finance economists have devoted a great deal of attention to the problem of 
the design of optimal taxes.  Of course, this is a normative issue, and it cannot be 
answered without a statement of ethical goals.  To begin, suppose that the goal is to raise 
a given amount of money with the smallest amount of excess burden possible.  There are 
a variety of ways to characterize the result.  One of the most elegant is the rule that as 
long as goods are unrelated in consumption (that is, are neither substitutes nor 
complements), then the more responsive demand is to price, the lower should be the tax 
rate on that commodity.  The intuition behind this rule is straightforward.  Efficient taxes 
should distort decisions as little as possible.  The potential for distortion is greater the 
more responsive the demand for the commodity is to its price.  Therefore, efficient 
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taxation requires that relatively high rates of taxation be levied on goods whose demands 
are relatively unresponsive to their price. 
  This result strikes many people as ethically unappealing.  For example, the 
demand for food is relatively unresponsive to changes in its price.  Is it really desirable to 
tax food at relatively high rates?  Most people would argue that it is not desirable, 
because their ethical views indicate that a tax system should have vertical equity:  It 
should distribute burdens fairly across people with different abilities to pay.  Public 
finance economists have shown how to modify the efficiency rule to account for the 
distributional consequences of taxation.  Suppose, for example, that the poor spend a 
greater proportion of their income on commodity X than do the rich, and vice versa for 
commodity Y.  Then even if the demand for X is less responsive to price than the  
demand for Y, optimal taxation may require a higher rate of tax on Y than X.  True, a 
high tax rate on Y creates a relatively large excess burden, but it also tends to redistribute 
income toward the poor.  As in other areas of public finance, the optimal policy depends 
on the extent to which society is willing to tradeoff efficiency for fairness (Auerbach and 
Hines (forthcoming)). 
  With its focus on efficiency and fairness issues, the theory of optimal taxation 
falls directly within the framework of conventional welfare economics.  There are other 
criteria for tax design that are not reconciled so easily with welfare economics.  The main 
one is horizontal equity, the notion that people in equal positions should pay equal 
amounts of taxes.  One problem with implementing this principle is defining equal 
positions.  The most common criterion is income, but wealth and consumption are also 
possible.  A problem with all three measures, however, is that they are the outcomes of   16
people’s decisions.  Two individuals may have exactly the same wage rate, but one 
chooses to work 1000 hours per year while another chooses to work 2000 hours per year.  
Despite the fact that they have different incomes, in a meaningful sense they are in “equal 
positions” because their potential to earn income is the same.   
  Things are complicated further by the fact that adjustments in market prices may 
render some horizontal inequities more apparent than real.  Suppose, for example, that in 
one type of job a large part of compensation consists of amenities that are not taxable--
pleasant offices, access to a swimming pool, and so forth.  In another occupation, 
compensation is exclusively monetary, all of which is subject to income taxation.  This 
would appear to be a violation of horizontal equity, because the person in the job with a 
lot of amenities has too small a tax burden.  But, if both arrangements coexist and 
individuals are free to chose, then the net after-tax rewards (including amenities) must be 
the same in both jobs.  Otherwise, people would leave the job with the lower net after-tax 
rewards.  In short, the fact that amenities are not taxed is not unfair, because the before- 
tax monetary compensation falls by just enough to offset this advantage.  Put another 
way, introducing taxation for such amenities would create horizontal inequities 
(Feldstein (1976)). 
  We conclude that horizontal equity is a rather amorphous concept.  Yet it has 
enormous appeal as a principle of tax design.  Notions of fairness among equals, 
regardless of their vagueness, will continue to play an important role in the development 
of tax policy. 
 
5.  Revenue Raising Instruments   17
  Public finance economists have used the theoretical framework discussed in 
Section 4 above to analyze the various revenue sources used by modern governments.  
This section discusses briefly some of the key issues associated with each kind of tax. 
  5.1  Income Tax 
  Taxes on income play a major role in the fiscal systems of all western countries.  
A starting point for the analysis and evaluation of real world income tax systems is a 
definition of income.  Traditionally, public finance economists use the so-called Haig-
Simons definition:  Income is the money value of the net increase in an individual’s 
power to consumer during a period.  This is equal to the amount actually during the 
period plus net additions to wealth.  Net additions to wealth--saving--must be included in 
income because they represent an increase in potential consumption.  Importantly, the 
Haig-Simons criterion requires the inclusion of all sources of potential increases in 
consumption, regardless of whether the actual consumption takes place, and regardless of 
the form in which the consumption occurs.  While not uncontroversial, the Haig-Simons 
definition provides a useful guide. 
  The Haig-Simons definition encompasses those items ordinarily thought of an 
income:  wages and salaries, business profits, rents, royalties, dividends, and interest.  
These forms of income are relatively easy to measure and to tax.  However, in other 
contexts, implementing the Haig-Simons criterion can lead to major problems. 
5   Some 
examples follow: 
•  Only income net of business expenses increases potential consumption power.  
But distinguishing between consumption and costs of obtaining income can be 
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difficult.  To what extent is a desk bought for an office at home just furniture, and 
to what extent is it a business expense? 
•  A capital gain is the increase in the value of an asset--say, a share of stock-- 
during a period of time.  From a Haig-Simons point of view, a capital gain is 
income whether or not the stock is actually sold, because the capital gain 
represents an increase in potential to consume.  However, captial gains and losses 
may be very difficult o measure, particularly when the assets are not sold.  Indeed, 
in general, no attempts are made to tax capital gains of assets that have not 
actually been sold. 
•  In-kind services are not easy to value.  One important example is the income 
produced by people who do housework rather than participate in the market. 
Such difficulties in implementing a Haig-Simons concept of income are of great 
practical significance.  To the extent that income that comes in certain forms cannot be 
taxed, individuals’ decisions are biased in the direction of taking their income in those 
forms.  Thus, for example, there is a bias in favor of capital gains (which are taxed only 
when the asset is sold) as opposed to dividend income (which is taxed as it is earned).  
Such biases create efficiency losses to the economy. Further, complicated rules are often 
needed to determine whether a certain type of income falls in a category that is favored 
by the tax system.  Capital gains again provides a good example; it is not always obvious 
whether the return that an individual receives from a company is a dividend or a capital 
gain.  Such complexity leads to substantial compliance costs. 
  In additions, several forms of income that would be administratively relatively 
easy to tax are partially or altogether excluded from the income tax bases of most   19
countries.  An important example is the return on saving that is deposited in retirement 
accounts.  Indeed, given the extent to which income that is saved in various forms is 
excluded from taxation, it is a misnomer to characterize these systems as income taxes.  
They are more a hybrid between income and consumption taxes.  
  5.2  Corporation Income Tax 
  Corporations are independent legal entities and as such are subject to taxes on 
their incomes.  Most public finance economists believes that it makes little sense to levy a 
special tax on corporations.  Only real people can pay a tax; hence, it would make more 
sense to tax the incomes of corporation owners via the personal income tax.  Again, this 
distinction is of more than academic importance.  Treating the corporation as a 
freestanding entity for tax purposes leads to important distortions in economic activity.  
To see why, note that when a corporation earns income it is taxed once at the corporate 
level, and then again when it is paid out to shareholders in the form of dividends.  In 
effect, then, corporate income that is paid out in the form of dividends is double taxed.  
This biases businesses against organizing in corporate form.  Moreover, double taxation 
of corporate income effectively increases the tax rate on the return to corporate 
investments.  This reduces the volume of investment undertaken by corporations, 
although there is substantial disagreement about the magnitude of this effect. 
  The incidence of the corporation tax is highly controversial.   In one highly 
influential model due to Harberger (1962), the tax on corporate capital leads to a 
migration of capital from the corporate sector until after-tax rates of return are equal 
throughout the economy.  In the process, the rate of return to capital in the noncorporate 
sector is depressed so that ultimately all owners of capital, not just those in the corporate   20
sector, are affected.  The reallocation of capital between the two sectors also affects the 
return to labor.  Most public finance economists believe that the burden of the 
corporation tax is split between labor and capital, although the is significant disagreement 
about the exact division. 
  If corporate income were untaxed, individuals could avoid personal income taxes 
by accumulating income with corporations.  Evidently, this would lead to serious equity 
and efficiency problems.  The question is whether there is a way to integrate personal and 
corporate income taxes into a single system so as to avoid the distortions associated with 
double taxation.  The most radical solution to this problem is called full integration.  
Under this approach, all earnings of the corporation during a given year, whether they are 
distributed or not, are attributed to stockholders just as if the corporation were a 
partnership.  The corporation tax as a separate entity is eliminated.  This approach has not 
been implemented in any country, in part because of administrative problems.  The 
dividend relief approach is less extreme.  With it, the corporation can deduct dividends 
paid to stockholders.  Although this approach eliminates the double taxation of dividends, 
it still maintains the corporation tax as a separate entity.  Variants on this approach are 
used in a number of European nations. 
  5.3  Consumption Taxes 
  The base of a consumption tax is the value (or quantity) of commodities sold to a 
person for actual consumption, as opposed to an income tax, whose base is the change in 
potential consumption.  Consumption taxes tax a variety of forms.  A retail sales tax is 
levied on the purchase of a commodity.  In the United States, retail sales taxes are not a   21
significant component of revenue at the national level, but they are at the state level.  
Even there, though, the rates generally do not exceed 7 percent or so. 
  In Europe, the most important type of consumption tax is a value-added tax 
(VAT).  The value-added at each stage of production of a commodity is the difference 
between the firm’s sales and the purchased material inputs used in production.  If a firm 
pays $100 for its material inputs and sells its output for $150, then its value added is $50.  
A VAT is a percentage tax on value added at each stage of production.  For example, if 
the VAT rate were 10 percent, then the firm’s tax liability would be $5.  Note that the 
total value of a commodity when it is finally sold is equal to the sum of the value-added 
at each stage of production.  Hence, a VAT of 10 percent applied to each stage is 
equivalent to a 10 percent tax on the final product.  In Europe, VAT rates are as high as 
25 percent.  With rates of such levels,  evasion is likely to be a problem for retail sales 
taxes; VATs are easier to administer, which accounts for their popularity.
6   
  A distinguishing feature of both VATs and retail sales taxes is that the tax liability 
does not depend on the characteristics of the buyer.  Whether one is rich or poor, the rate 
is the same.  This prompts concerns over equity, which have been dealt with by applying 
lower rates to commodities such as food and medicine.  But this may not be an effective 
way to deal with equity concerns.  For example, even if it is true that food expenditures 
on average play an especially important role in the budgets of the poor, there are still 
many upper-income families whose food consumption is proportionately very high.  In 
recent years, public finance economists have given a great deal of attention to the 
problem of designing personal consumption taxes.  Such taxes require individuals to file 
                                                 
6 See Cnossen (1998) for a discussion of issues relating to the implementation of VATs.   22
tax returns and write checks to the government, allowing tax liabilities to depend on 
personal circumstances. 
  One example is a cash-flow tax.  Each household files a return reporting its annual 
consumption expenditures during the year.  Just as under the personal income tax, various 
exemptions and deductions can be taken to allow for special circumstances, and a 
progressive marginal rate schedule applied to taxable consumption.   From an 
administrative viewpoint, the major question is how to compute annual consumption.  
Taxpayers would report their incomes, and then subtract all saving.  To keep track of 
saving, qualified accounts would be established at various financial institutions.  Whether 
a cash-flow tax is administratively feasible is very controversial.
7  Many analysts believe 
that its record-keeping requirements would make it very difficult or impossible 
administratively. 
 5.4    Wealth  Taxes 
 Wealth   is the value of the assets an individual has accumulated as of a given 
time.  Wealth taxes do not play a major role in the fiscal systems of any western 
countries.  One justification of taxing wealth is that it is a good measure of an 
individual’s ability to pay taxes.  This is a controversial issue.  Suppose that a miser has 
accumulated a huge hoard of gold that yields no income.  Should she be taxed on the 
value of the hoard?  Some believe that as long as the miser was subject to the income tax 
while the hoard was accumulating, it should not be taxed again.  Others would argue that 
the gold per se generates satisfaction and power for the individual, and should therefore 
be subject to tax.  Perhaps the major problem with this argument is that many rich people 
have a substantial component of their wealth in human capital--their stock of education,   23
skills, and so on.  However, there is no way to value human capital except by reference to 
the income it yields.  This logic points back to income as the appropriate base. 
  Some nations levy taxes on wealth only when it is transferred at the time of the 
death of the owner.  These are referred to as estate taxes.  Estate tax proponents argue 
that it is a valuable tool for creating a more equal distribution of income.  Further, many 
believe that ultimately, all property belongs to society as a whole.  During an individual’s 
life, society permits her to dispose of the property she has managed to accumulate as she 
wishes.  But at death, the property reverts to society, which can dispose of it at will.   
Opponents argue that it is fundamentally wrong to argue that a person holds wealth only 
at the pleasure of “society,” or that “society” ever has any valid claim on personal 
wealth.
8 
  A controversial issue is the incentives created by an estate tax.  Suppose that an 
individual is motivated to work hard during his lifetime to leave a large estate for his 
children.  The presence of an estate tax might discourage his work effort.  On the other 
hand, with an estate tax, a greater amount of wealth has to be accumulated to leave a 
given after-tax bequest, so the tax might induce the individual to work harder to maintain 
the net value of his estate.  Consequently, the effect of an estate tax on a donor’s work 
effort is logically indeterminate.  Similarly, one cannot predict how the tax will affect the 
amount of saving.  There is currently very little in the way of empirical evidence on these 
incentive issues. 
  To the extent that an estate tax reduces saving, it may actually increase inequality.  
If there is less saving, then there is less capital  investment.  With less capital with which 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 The difficulties and advantages of this system are discussed in Pechman (1980). 
8 See Gale and Slemrod (2000) for further details.   24
to work, the real wages of workers decrease and under certain circumstances, the share of 
income going to labor falls.  To the extent that capital income is more unequally 
distributed than labor income, the effect is to increase inequality.  This scenario is 
hypothetical.  It simply emphasizes a point made above in a variety of different contexts--
to understand the impact of a tax, one must take into account how taxpayers respond to it. 
  5.5  Deficit Finance 
  In addition to taxation, the government’s other major source of revenue is 
borrowing.  The deficit during a time period is the excess of spending over revenues.  The 
national debt at a given time is the sum of all past budget deficits.  That is, the debt is the 
cumulative excess of past spending over past receipts.  Future generations either have to 
retire the debt or else refinance it.  It would appear, then, that future generations must 
bear the burden of the debt.  But the theory of incidence tells us that this line of reasoning 
is questionable.  Merely because the legal burden in on future generations does not mean 
that they bear a real burden.  Just as in the case of tax incidence, the answer depends on 
economic behavior. 
  Assume that the government borrows from its own citizens.  One view is that 
such an internal debt creates no burden for the future generation.  Members of the future 
generation simply owe it to each other.  There is a transfer of income from those who do 
not hold bonds to the bondholders, but the generation as a whole is no worse off int he 
sense that its consumption level is the same as it would have been. 
  This story ignores the fact that economic decisions can be affected by government 
debt policy.  According to the neoclassical model of the debt, when the government 
borrows, it competes for funds with individuals and firms who want the money for their   25
own investment projects.  Hence, debt finance leaves the future generation with a smaller 
capital stock, other things being the same.  Its members therefore are less productive and 
have smaller real incomes than otherwise would have been the case.  Thus, the debt 
imposes a burden on future generations, through its impact on capital formation.  The key 
assumption in this argument is that public spending crowds out private investment.  
Whether crowding out actually occurs is a controversial issue; the empirical evidence is 
mixed (Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999)). 
  A further complication is introduced when we consider individuals’ transfers 
across generations.  Suppose that when the government borrows,  people realize that their 
heirs will be made worse off.  Suppose further that people care about the welfare of their 
descendants and do not want their descendants’ consumption levels reduced.  What can 
they do about this?  They can save more to increase their bequests by an amount 
sufficient to pay the extra taxes that will be due in the future.  The result is that nothing 
really changes.  Each generation consumes exactly the same amount as before the 
government borrowed. 
  The striking conclusion is that private individuals undo the intergenerational 
effects of government debt policy so that tax and debt finance are essentially equivalent.  
This view is sometimes referred to as the Ricardian model because its antecedents 
appeared int eh work of the 19th century economist David Ricardo.  (However, Ricardo 
was skeptical about the theory that now bears his name.)  Some public finance 
economists have challenged the plausibility of the  Ricardian model.  They believe that 
information on the implications of current deficits for future tax burdens is not easy to 
obtain.  Another criticism is that people are not as farsighted and not as altruistic as   26
supposed in the model.  A number of statistical studies have examined the relationship 
between budget deficits and private saving.  The evidence is rather mixed, and the 
Ricardian model has both critics and adherents among professional economists. 
  From time to time, events such as natural disaster and wars lead to temporary 
increases in federal government expenditures.  An old question in public finance is 
whether such expenditures should be financed with taxes or borrowing. 
 
6.  Fiscal Federalism 
  The analysis so far has assumed that a nation has one government that sets tax and 
expenditure policies.  In contrast, many countries have a federal system, which consists 
of different levels of government that provide public goods and services and have some 
scope for making decisions.  The subject of fiscal federalism concerns the activities of the 
various levels of government and how they relate to each other.  A key question is the 
optimal allocation of responsibilities among different levels of government.  Posed within 
the framework of welfare economics, the question is whether a centralized or 
decentralized system is more likely to enhance efficiency and equity (Oates (1999)).   
  Among the disadvantages of a decentralized system is that individual 
communities may ignore the externalities they create.  Suppose, for example, that some 
jurisdiction provides excellent public education for its children.  If some of the children 
eventually emigrate to other jurisdictions, the other communities benefit from having a 
higher quality work force.  But in deciding how much education to provide, the 
jurisdiction only considers its own welfare.  Therefore, it may provide an inefficiently 
low amount of education.  More generally, if each community cares only about its own   27
members, then any positive or negative externalities it creates for other communities are 
overlooked. According to the standard arguments made above, resources are allocated 
inefficiently. 
  Another disadvantage of a decentralized system relates to the fact that for certain 
public services, the cost per person falls as the number of users increases.  Suppose that 
the more people who use a public library, the lower the cost per user.  If each community 
sets up its own library, costs per user are higher than necessary.  A central government, 
on the other hand, could build one library for the region, allowing people to benefit from 
scale economies.  Of course, various activities are subject to different scale economies.  
The optimal scale for library services might differ from that for fire protection, and both 
surely differ from the optimal scale for national defense.  This observation helps 
rationalize a system of overlapping jurisdictions--each jurisdiction can handle those 
services with scale economies that are appropriate for the jurisdiction’s size. 
  Decentralized systems can also lead to inefficiencies with respect to raising 
revenues.  Taxes levied by decentralized communities are unlikely to be efficient from a 
national standpoint.  Instead, communities are likely to select taxes on the basis of 
whether they can be exported to outsiders.  For example, jurisdictions that have a near-
monopoly on certain natural resources such as coal may impose large taxes on these 
commodities, figuring that they will be shifted largely to coal users outside the 
community.   
  A major advantage to a decentralized system is that it allows communities to 
tailor their public services to the tastes of their residents.  Tastes for public services, just 
like the tastes for all other commodities, vary across people.  A centralized government   28
tends to provide the same level of public services throughout the country, regardless of 
the fact that people’s tastes differ.  It is inefficient to provide individuals with more or 
less of a public good than they desire if the quantity they receive can be more closely 
tailored t their preferences.  Under a decentralized system, individuals with similar tastes 
for public goods group together, so communities are more likely to provide the types and 
quantities of public goods desired by their inhabitants. 
  Another advantage is that decentralized systems foster intergovernmental 
competition.  If citizens can choose among communities, then substantial government 
mismanagement may cause citizens to chose to live elsewhere.  This threat may create 
incentives to government managers to produce more efficiently and be more responsive 
to their residents. 
  Finally, a decentralized system may enhance experimentation and innovation in 
locally provided goods and services.  For many policy questions, no one is certain what 
the right answer is, or even whether there is a single solution that is best in all situations.  
One way to find out is to let each community choose its own way, and then compare the 
results.  For example,  some jurisdictions might choose to provide innovative job-training 
programs for individuals who lose their jobs.  If the innovations are successful, other 
jurisdictions can imitate them.  If not, the costs to the country as a whole are small. 
  This discussion makes it clear that a purely decentralized system cannot be 
expected to maximize social welfare.  Efficiency requires that those services that affect 
the entire country, such as national defense, be provided at the national level.  On the 
other hand, it seems appropriate for goods that affect only the members of a particular 
jurisdiction to be provided locally.  This leaves us with the in-between case of   29
community activities that create externalities that are not national in scope.  While one 
solution would be to create a single regional government, a larger jurisdiction carries the 
cost of less responsiveness to local differences in tastes.  An alternative method is a 
system of taxes and subsidies.  The central government can subsidize activities that create 
positive externalities.  In some countries, central governments give grants to communities 
that roughly follow this model. 
 
7.  Public Finance and  Public Choice 
  Traditionally, the field of public finance has tended to convey a rather rosy view 
of government.  With a tax here, an expenditure there, the state readily corrects all market 
imperfections, meanwhile seeing to it that incomes are distributed in an ethically 
desirable way.  The implicit assumption is that the government is a neutral and benign 
force.   In contrast, the field of public choice assumes that individuals view government 
as a mechanism for maximizing their self interest.  Such a viewpoint can lead to rather 
different conclusions from those of conventional public finance. 
  A good example is provided by optimal tax theory.  Suppose that in a certain 
society, there are three commodities, X, Y, and leisure.  Labor is totally fixed in supply, 
and therefore, income is fixed.  Note that a proportional tax at the same rate on X and Y 
is equivalent to a tax on income.  Now, suppose that currently, this society levies a tax on 
X, but its constitution forbids taxing Y.  Viewing this situation, a student of optimal tax 
theory might say something like, “You are running an inefficient tax system.  You could 
eliminate excess burden if you taxed X and Y at equal rates--an income tax.  I   30
recommend that you lower the tax on X and impose a tax at the same rate on Y.  Set the 
rates so that the same amount of revenue is collected as before.” 
  Suppose, however, that the citizens suspect that if they allow taxation of Y, their 
politicians will not lower the tax rate on X.  Rather, they will simply take advantage of 
the opportunity to tax something new to make tax revenues as large as possible.  
Therefore, by constitutionally precluding the taxation of Y, the citizens may be rationally 
protecting themselves against an inefficiently large public sector.  In other words, if 
government does not necessarily act in the interest of its citizens, then what looks 
inefficient from the point of view of optimal tax theory may be efficient in a public 
choice setting.
9 
  In recent years,  public choice has had substantial influence on the field of public 
finance.  In both theoretical and empirical work, public finance economists study the 
incentives facing government decision-makers, and how these incentives affect policy 
outcomes.  In making their own policy recommendations, there is a heightened awareness 
that a policy that emerges from the legislative process may look quite different from the 
original proposal, and one should take this into effect in formulating recommendations.  
In the future, one can expect both Public Finance and Public Choice to continue to enjoy 
the benefits of intellectual cross-fertilization. 
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